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WHAT IS A "CLEAN" BILL OF LADING?-A PROBLEM
IN FINANCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE
Daniel C. Draper*
United States exporters are frequently unwilling to ship to foreign
importers against payment on delivery in the foreign country, and
require that the foreigner pay when the goods are delivered for ship-
ment to the carrier in the United States.' In order to do this, the
importer usually makes a contract with his foreign bank by which
that bank agrees to induce its United States correspondent to issue its
own letter of credit or confirm the foreign bank's letter of credit
in favor of the United States exporter. By this letter of credit,
the United States bank obliges itself to pay the United States exporter
the amount due for the goods if he presents to the bank documents, such
as commercial and consular invoices, a marine insurance policy, and a
"clean" bill of lading evidencing delivery to the carrier for shipment.-
Such a credit is known as a documentary letter of credit and is distin-
guished from a clean letter of credit where the issuing bank agrees to pay
unconditionally and thus where no documents are required. The docu-
mentary letter of credit device allows the United States exporter to collect
his money when the documents are presented at a time on or before
shipment is made, and thus the exporter gets the use of the money during
the pendency of any dispute and avoids both the risk of fluctuating ex-
change and the difficulty of establishing the credit standing of a foreign
importer. In fact the goods shipped, however, may be defective, but even
where defects are not visible, the foreign buyer must rely on the carrier
noting the defect on the printed form of the bill. The sole duty of the
bank issuing the letter is to see that, on paying, it receives proper
documents. In the letter of credit situation, the crucial question,
therefore, upon which the respective rights and liabilities of the exporter,
importer and banks turn is the status of the documents, and the require-
ment of a "clean" bill of lading presents perhaps the chief problem in
determining that status.
*See Contributors' Section, Masthead, page , for biographical data. The writer wishes
to acknowledge his indebtedness to his colleagues Messrs. Albert 3. Walker and Richard
C. Packard, whose assistance made this study possible.
1 The reverse transaction of an exporter in a foreign country and a U. S. importer also
takes place, but -usually in that case the foreign bank that makes payment passes on the
"cleanliness" of the bill of lading and thus in such a case litigation would not arise in the
United States. This might not be the case where credits were issued here and confirmed
abroad.
* See Contributors' Section, Masthead, page 69, for biographical data. The writer wishes
City Bank of New York, 69 F. 2d 312 (9th Cir. 1934).
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Since the letter of credit-bill of lading device is of relatively recent
development,3 and for other reasons to be discussed, the courts have had
little occasion to treat the problem. The question of what notations
superimposed4 on a bill of lading will render it "foul" has, curiously
enough, in view of the importance of the problem to the daily transaction
of large scale commercial banking, excited only passing and inconclusive
comment on the part of text writers. Ward and Harfield's well-known
work' raises the problem without reaching any solution. In his work on
Sales6 Professor Williston confined himself to citing an earlier edition
of Ward and the following general statement:
A bill of lading is called "foul" if there is any notation thereon indicating
that the goods are in bad condition. A buyer who is bound to pay cash
against bills of lading is clearly entitled to a clean bill of lading; that is,
one which does not indicate any defect in the goods. A question might
be raised whether the defect indicated in a foul bill of lading might not be
so slight as not to amount to such a breach of contract as would justify
the buyer in refusing the goods. As to this matter, banks were unwilling
to take any risks and insisted on regarding notations of the carrier with
reference to the condition of merchandise or its container as an irregularity
justifying the rejection of the merchandise.
Wlliston does not discuss precisely what notations should be taken
as indicating that the goods are in "bad condition." In the last part of
the quotation, he seems to indicate that, at one time at least, any "nota-
tions of the carrier with reference to the condition of the merchandise
or its container" justified the bank in rejecting a bill of lading. Appar-
ently Williston derived this view from a consideration7 of the practice
of rejecting bills of lading containing any notation which the litigation
resulting from the 1920 commodity price debacle temporarily forced upon
the banking community. The pressure of rapidly falling prices encour-
3 FKFsTF, LEGAL AsPEcTs or CorzaRcm4 Lavmrts oF CRx)T 4-7 (1930). The
Federal Reserve Act of 1914 explicitly authorized National Banks to accept time drafts'or
to issue letters of credit. See WHTrAXER, FoaxiGx EXcH FE 134, n. 1 (1922); YoRx,
INTERNATIoNAL EXCH[ANGE 298 et seq. (1923) ; WARD, AmERicAN COmERCL CREDITS, c. 1
(1922). Letters of credit were in use, however, during the nineteenth century. See WAmD
AND HAR=D, BANK CREDrs AND AccEPrAncs 68-70 (1948).
4 By "superimposed" something more is meant than the filling in of blanks on the
printed form of the bill. See The Idefjord, 114 F. 2d 262 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied sub
norn Norske Amerikalinje v. Blumenthal Import Co., 311 U.S. 707 (1940). (These words
printed in small capitals appeared on the bill 'of lading: "Subject to all terms appearing
in the bills of lading at present in use by Messrs. :' The blank was filled in:
"The "oncarrying line of steamers." The Court properly considered this a "clean" bill
of lading.)
6 WARD AND HAn=LD, op. cit. supra note 3.
6 WILLISTON, SALES § 405c (rev. ed. 1948).
7 See WARD, op. cit. supra note 3.
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aged buyers to seize upon any pretext that might suggest that the goods
were in unsatisfactory condition and thus permit an escape from a
promise to purchase at prices higher than those then prevailing. Under
these circumstances some banks tended, as Williston states, to reject bills
containing any notation.8
Recurrent dicta originating in the earlier cases and authorities tended
to support the banks' view. In The Isla de Panay, a case where the de-
fect in the goods was not noted on the bill, the court stated:
The bills of lading which were issued in these cases were what are known
as "clean" bills. A clean bill of lading is one which contains nothing in
the margin qualifying the words in the bill of lading itself.9
More recently in Roberts v. Calmar S.S. Corporation, the court reiterated
the formula but indicated that it only applied "broadly speaking":
However, broadly speaking, it may be said that a "clean" bill of lading
is one which contains nothing in the margin qualifying the words of the
bill of lading itself.10
This study will look into the extent that the proposition that "any
notation" superimposed on a bill of lading renders it "foul" is valid.
Neither Williston nor the other authorities, for example, discuss how
banks are to treat the disclaimers of liability that carriers frequently
stamp on bills. Such disclaimers do not establish that the goods are in
bad condition. They only state that the carrier is not responsible for
the condition whatever it may be. Williston, moreover, in the quotation
already discussed, raises another problem and states, "A question might
be raised whether the defect indicated in a foul bill of lading might not
be so slight as not to amount to such a breach of the contract as would
justify the buyer in refusing the goods." The problem of carrier's dis-
claimers will be discussed first, then the problem of what notations
stamped on a bill are sufficiently substantial to justify rejecting it, and
finally certain provisions of the usual letter and application for a letter.
The term "clean bill of lading" was in current commercial usage long
8 Perhaps because of the general uncertainty of the law, however, United States
exporters apparently chose to proceed against the importer directly upon the underlying
contract rather than proceed against the bank issuing the letter of credit and litigate pre-
cisely what was a "clean" bill of lading. At least relatively few 'of the reported cases show
litigation on the letter of credit contract. Both the tendency of banks and their customers
in normal times to avoid litigation and thus preserve good will, and recently the existence
of promulgated Uniform Customs (to be discussed infra p. 67) have further tended to reduce
the volume of litigation. The sketchiness of the text writers thus arises from the lack
of case law.
9 292 Fed. 723, 730 (2d Cir. 1923), affd, 267 U.S. 260 (1925).
10 59 F. Supp. 203, 209 (E.D. Pa. 1945).
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before its application in the documentary letter of credit situation and
earlier cases (which did not arise in this context) throw light on the
term's meaning, and particularly the effect of carrier's disclaimer nota-
tions. Restitution Steamship v. Sir John Pirie & Company1 involved a
charterer's agreement to pay advance freight eight days after the signing
of a "clean" bill of lading. Because of the failure of the vessel to load on
schedule, demurrage accrued, and the question was whether a bill which
carried with it such liability was "clean." The court found that it was
"clean" and stated:
Now I have had some little difficulty in finding out what 'is meant by a
clean bill of lading. There does not seem to be any case which has ever
pressed much on the subject, but there is a very clear statement as to the
meaning of the phrase "clean bill of lading" to be found in Pollock and
Druce's Law of Merchant Shipping, and there it Is said that a clean bill
of lading is a bill of lading which contains nothing in the margin qualifying
the words in the bill of lading itself, "Shipped in good order and well-
conditioned; goods of a certain character, or a certain weight or quality
or what not." .But where, for instance, you insert in the margin of the bill
of lading the weight or quantity or quality unknown, that is not a clean
bill of lading, because that contains a qualification. Where, 6n the other
hand, there is no such qualification inserted in the margin, there the bill
of lading is a clean one. Looked at according to that definition this bill of
lading is a clean one.12
This dictum thus reiterates the usual formula that a "clean" bill of
lading must contain "nothing" qualifying the words "shipped in apparent
good order and well-conditioned." In particular, the court emphasizes
that a carrier's exemption of liability, "weight, quantity or quality un-
known" qualifies the words "shipped in apparent good order and
condition."
A Scottish decision also discusses the effect of carriers' disclaimers.
Craig and Rose v. Delargy'3 involved a shipment of casks of oil from
Bougie, Algeria to Leith, Scotland. All parties admitted the casks on
loading were defective and that the original shipper, the assignor of the
plaintiff, knew this. The captain of the loading ship also saw that they
were defective, but, instead of setting out the defect in detail, merely
noted on the bill "not responsible for weight, quality, leakage, or
breakage." The holders of the bill sued the shipper and alleged that
the shipper in fact knew that the goods did not meet the stipulation in
the bill of lading that they were in apparent good order and condition.
The Scottish Court of Session held that the disclaimer clause above was
11 61 L.T.R. 330 (Q.B. 1889).
12 Id. at 333.
Is 16 Scot. L.R. 750 (1879).
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effective against the original shipper who had notice of the defects, and
that, under the Bills of Lading Act,14 the endorsee had no greater rights
than the original shipper. Lord Shand, one of the several justices who
rendered opinions seriatim, however, stated in passing:
The result therefore is that this bill of lading contained on its face notice
to any endorsee taking it sufficient to put him on his guard. It was not a
clean bill of lading, if thereby be meant a bill of lading that is free from
all exception.... 15
He thus seems to suggest as an alternative ground for the decision
that, even if the holder of the bill as a bona fide purchaser could have
greater rights than his transferee, the stamped notation put him on
notice. He, however, later seems to indicate that, contrary to his earlier
suggestion, a "clean" bill of lading need not be "free from all exception."
Thus he states:
Now, I suppose the bills of lading in these two cases [both contained
carrier disclaimers] ... would in loose language have been referred to as
clean bills of lading .... The onerous endorsee would say-I have got a
clean bill of lading, and I may rely on getting my full quantity of manga-
nese, or the silk contained in these bales.16
Lord Shand never really indicates which of the two views discussed he
intends to adopt.
As Lord Shand points out, however, notations exempting carriers
from liability were customary long before the decisions in The Resti-
tution and Craig Rose cases. In Jessel v. Bath,17 for example, the ship-
master receipted for manganese giving the weight in detail, but noted on
the bill "weight, contents and value unknown." Baron Bramwell held
that the carrier was not liable, and that such disclaimers were not against
public policy. In Lebeau v. General Steam Navigation,"5 where a parcel
of goods was shipped described as linen when in fact it was a type of
silk, the court held that the words "weight, value and contents unknown"
when stamped on the bill, absolved the carrier from liability.19 Today,
Article 18 of the Uniform Customs Agreement, 20 adopted by most United
14 18 Vict. c. 3 (1892).
15 Craig and Rose v. Delargy, 16 Scot. L.R. 750, 759 (1879).
16 Ibid. The two cases referred to are Jessel v. Bath, [1867] L.R. 2 Ex. 267; and Lebeau
v. General Steam Navigation, [18721 L.R. 8 C.P. 88, to be discussed infra.
17 [18671 L.R. 2 Ex. 267.
18 [18721 L.R. 8 C.P. 88.
19 For an early U.S. decision to the same effect, see The Delaware, 81 U.S. 579 (1871)
where the particular bill contained in its text "Vessel not accountable for breakage, leakage
or rust." The Court seemed to regard this as a valid and effective provision.
20 Uniform Customs and Practices for Commercial Documentary Credits fixed by the
Seventh Congress of the International Chamber of Commerce (hereinafter called the
[Vol. 3 7
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States banks in 1938, and incorporated in most letter of credit transac-
tions,2l explicitly provides that banks may accept shipping documents
bearing "reservations commonly made by carriers affixing stamps mention-
ing that they decline all responsibility for risks for which the goods are
liable by their nature, such as rusting, leakage of oil in barrels, breakage,
etc." Section 209 of the New York Personal Property Law2 specifically
provides that carriers shall not be liable where they state "contents or
conditions of packages unknown" or "shippers weight, load and count."'
The Federal statute' dealing with bills of lading issued by carriers
engaged in interstate or foreign commerce contains substantially similar
provisions.
Although cases and statutes holding exemptions of liability by carriers
valid are not necessarily conclusive on the somewhat different question
as to whether a bill is "clean" so that a bank can make a payment under
a letter of credit, still the authorities evidence a widespread use of such
exemptions, and, by the requirement that a bank accept only a "clean"
bill, the parties intend primarily to safeguard against unusual provisions
which might render bills unmarketable. This is in fact the rational basis
for the sharp distinction between matter stamped and matter incorpo-
rated in a bill of lading. Whether the defect is noted or disclaimed in
the text or stamped on the bill, the buyer who does not receive the goods
that he bargained for suffers equally. As a general rule, matter stamped
on the bill, however, is unusual and thus renders it unmarketable. If the
matter is embodied in the text of the bill, on the other hand, the provision
as a part of a form must have some general use and incorporates a risk
that, at least a number of buyers apparently have been willing to assume.
25
Uniform Customs), set out and discussed in WARD AND H AR tzE, BANK CRDia's AND
ACCEPTANCES C. 12 (1948).
21 The writer has examined the forms of application for a letter of credit (contract of
procuration) used by five of the major New York banks; and all the forms either incor-
porate the provisions of the Uniform Customs or contain provisions similar to that quoted
above. These forms are not used for applications made by correspondent banks, but the
writer understands that New York banks stipulate that the Uniform Customs apply to
those transactions. See note 40 infra.
22 N.Y. PERS. PRoP. L. § 209 et seq. (1949). These sections correspond to UmroPam
Bu.rs or LmXG AcT § 23 ff.
23 N.Y. PERS. PROP. L. § 209 (1949).
24 39 STAT. 541 (1916), 49 U.S.C.A. § 101 (1951). The Harter Act, 27 STAT. 445 (1893),
46 U.S.C. §§ 190-96 (1946), makes unlawful stipulations relieving carriers from liability
for negligence, and from the exercise of due diligence in equipping the vessels. See Note,
Limitations of Carriers' Liability and the Conflict of Laws, 54 HARv. L..REv. 663 (1941).
25 In most cases statutes control, at least to some extent, the text of bills of lading.
Section 4 of the Harter Act, 27 STAT. 445 (1893), 46 U.S.C. § 193 (1946), for example,
provides:
It shall be the duty of the owner or owners, masters, or agent of any vessel trans-
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Carriers do not embody some customary disclaimers in bills because,
though in general use, they apparently are not used sufficiently often to
justify a special form. On principle, however, the existence of customary
disclaimers, such as "shipper's weight, load and count" or "weight, con-
tents and value unknown," should not affect the bank's accepting the
bill.
In Camp v. Corn Exchange National Bank,26 in determining whether
the bank should have accepted the bill, the Pennsylvania Court looked
to see if the matter stamped on the bills was "customary." The opinion
first set out the facts about the bill:
The bill of lading, in addition to the printed provisions, had written
across 'its face, in red ink, special notations setting forth that the steamer
was not responsible for bursting of bags -and loss of contents or for liqui-
faction of sugar. Other typ'written notices set forth that all expenses in-
curred at the destination, such as repairing packages, including cost of
materials, should be paid by the consignee before delivery, and that the
steamer was not responsible for breakage or loss of contents due to frail
packages.
2 7
The American purchaser contended that this was not a "clean" bill
of lading and instructed the Corn Exchange Bank to make no payments
under its letter of credit. The bank, however, paid the draft. The bank
sued the purchaser for reimbursement. After holding that the disclaimers
by the carrier were not contrary to public policy, the Pennsylvania Court
stated: "The letter of credit did not require a 'clean' bill of lading under
the strict interpretation that term has sometimes been given."' 2  Appar-
ently by "strict interpretation" the court referred to the doctrine that
any notation on the printed form made a bill foul. As we have already
seen, the courts, though repeating the formula as dicta, do not apply it
in any crucial cases. The court concluded that a purchaser had a right
to a bill of lading "conforming to the customary one," and thus did not
itself apply the "strict interpretation" test. Any finding that stamped dis-
porting merchandise or property from or between ports of the United States and
foreign ports to issue to shippers of any lawful merchandise a bill of lading, or
shipping document, stating, among other things, the marks necessary for identification,
number of packages, or quantity, stating whether it be carrier's or shipper's weight,
and apparent order or condition of such merchandise or property delivered to and
received by the owner, master, or agent of the vessel for transportation, and such
document shall be prima fade evidence of the receipt of the merchandise therein
described.
For an instance where the Act did not apply, however, see F. A. Straus & Co. v. Canadian
Pacific Ry., 254 N.Y. 407, 173 N.E. 564 (1930), 79 U. oF PA. L. REv. 635 (1931) (ocean
shipment from Shanghai to Vancouver and thence by rail to New York).
26 285 Pa. 337, 132 At. 189 (1926).
27 Id. at 341, 132 AUt. at 190.
28 Id. at 345, 132 Atl. at 191.
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claimers customarily 9 used by carriers rendered a bill "foul" would
seriously impede the expeditious transaction of commercial business.
Where a specific clause of the contract makes the Uniform Customs
apply, they will usually resolve questions of the validity of a particular
disclaimer, and, even where there is no specific clause making the Uniform
Customs applicable, the general customs that they evidence 0° should
control the solution of the carrier disclaimer problem.
In the Camp case, the court also pointed out that some of the nota-
tions did not add materially to the vendee's burden because they were
"substantially reiterations of what is contained in the printed part."'"
Thus whatever some experts may call a "clean" bill of lading, if the
notations really add nothing to the conditions in the printed text, then
a bank can ignore them and accept the bill.
We now pass to the second problem that Williston raises, the problem
of how banks are to treat statements stamped on the bill of lading that
are so insubstantial as not to affect the value of the goods shipped.
Problems of this kind are particularly difficult because there is virtually
no authority to serve as a guide in close cases. A leading but inconclusive
English cas 3 on the subject involved an action in which the National
Bank of Egypt sought to recover funds paid out on presentation of a
bill of lading which bore the notation "several bags torn and resewn";
the Court of Appeals and the lower court more or less tacitly assumed
that a bill bearing such a notation was not a "clean" bill because the
notation qualified the phrase in the body of the bill "in apparent good
order and condition." The defendants contended that the words "Bills
of Lading" as used in the exchange of letters which formed the under-
lying agreement signified "clean" bills of lading. The Court of Appeals,
however, expressly avoided this aspect of the problem and stated that,
29 Some carriers' disclaimers will render a bill foul. In The Kirkhill, 99 Fed. 575 (4th
Cir. 1900), the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit indicated a statement of cargo
"shipped on deck" would render a bill "foul."
30 See Dixon Irmaos & Cia. v. Chase Nat. Bank, 144 F. 2d 759 (2d Cir. 1944), cert.
denied, 324 U.S. 850 (1944) ; and Vietor v. Nat. City Bank, 200 App. Div. 557, 193 N.Y.
Supp. 868 (1st Dep't 1922).
31 Camp v. Corn Exchange Nat. Bank, 285 Pa. 337, 345, 132 Atl. 189, 191 (1926).
32 National Bank of Egypt v. Hannevig's Bank Ltd. 1 Li. List L.R. 69 (Ct. App. 1919).
See also Westminster Bank v. Banca Nazionale di Credito, 31 LI. List L.R. 306 (K.B. Div.
1928). The bill of lading bore a stamped notation stating that the frozen meat shipped was
"misshapen" and this implied that it had been refrozen, thus affecting "the meat's market-
ability. Although the British court just as in the Bank of Egypt case, supra, attempted to
avoid the problem it in effect held that the notation made the bill "foul." The court,
however, did not state that all notations superimposed on the printed form rendered the
bill foul.
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in view of the war conditions, they entertained some doubt that the buyer
intended to demand a "clean" bill. After considerable discussion, both
courts ultimately found that the defendants waived the defect in the
bags but such a finding would seem to involve the underlying premise
that a waiver was required because the bill was not "clean." The deci-
sion, however, never explains why the notation "several bags torn and
resewn" should render a bill foul, and thus is of little help in determining
precisely what constitutes a "clean" bill of lading. The English court,
however, nowhere repeats the formula familiar to the older cases that
all notations superimposed on the printed form render a bill "foul."
In a number of cases the problem of precisely what constitutes a
"clean" bill is relatively easy. If a bill of lading showing a shipment of
scrap iron, for example, bore the stamp "discolored," a bank with the
knowledge that the parties could reasonably expect it to have would know
that the noted matter would not affect the "apparent good order and
condition" of the scrap iron. If, for some unusual reason, a buyer wanted
scrap iron that was not "discolored,""3 he should designate this and any
other unusual requirements in his application for the letter of credit. A
closer and more difficult case arises where the notation implies rather
than states that the goods may arrive in bad condition. Since in order
to avoid possible liability, carriers naturally tend to note each and every
possible defect, one cannot fairly conclude that, merely by stamping a
notation implying a possible defect, the carrier necessarily indicates that
the stamped matter is sufficiently serious to affect the market value of
the goods. Under the Harter Act, carriers are not required, explicitly
at least, to pass on this question, but only to state the shipment's "appar-
ent order and condition."34 Strictly speaking, the fact that containers
were of "second-hand" lumber or that scrap iron was "discolored" would
be a part of that "apparent order." Under the letter of credit-bill of
lading scheme, however, a bank engages with the parties to determine
whether a bill is "clean." In requiring a "clean" bill, the parties to a
commercial transaction are really interested in the effect on market value
of a particular notation rather than the existence of notations in general.
If a buyer wants new lumber in the packing, he should specify it in his
application letter to the bank.
33 Another frequently recurring stamp of this type is the statement "container-second
hand lumber."
34 27 STAT. 445 (1893), 46 U.S.C. § 193 (1946). Thus, in The Caterina Gerolimich, 43
F. 2d 248 (E.D.N.Y. 1930), aff'd, 54 F. 2d 1080 (2d Cir. 1931), the Court held that ad-
mission by carrier in bill of lading reciting onions were received in apparent good order
applies only to the visible aspect of the subject matter. The court implied that no other
recital was required.
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Thus within the limits of the few decisions in the field, the bank
exercises the knowledge that it can reasonably be expected to have to
determine whether or not the notation is sufficiently serious to affect
market value. As a practical matter to affect market value, the impli-
cation of bad condition must either be a strong one or must be stated in
affirmative terms. Put in this way, the rule is not impossible for the
bank to apply. The frequently recurring notation "fragile containers,"
for example, would not render a bill foul unless the goods were of a type
that required strong packing, for instance glass, or unless the notation
were put in strong terms, for instance, "containers too fragile for proper
shipping."
In these cases, the bank's obligation is a dual one. It engages to the
beneficiary that, if the documents tendered conform to the requirements
of the letter of credit, it will accept the accompanying draft. Among
other things, it also engages to its principal, however, that if the docu-
ments do not conform to the contract in the application for a letter of
credit, 5 it will refuse to accept the accompanying draft. Thus a bank
under a letter of credit has a duty to its principal to reject a foul, and
a duty to its beneficiary to accept a clean bill. Where the authorities
are few and conflicting as in the problem of what is a "clean" bill of
lading, this dilemma is especially acute. Sometimes large sums are
involved. In the Corn Exchange case, for example, because of falling
prices of sugar in 1920, the purchaser, if he were successful in contending
that the bill was foul, stood to recoup some $290,000.
In order to make the problem less acute, in their application form for
a letter of credit most New York banks have provided certain exculpatory
clauses to the effect that the bank is protected if it acts in good faith.
A typical clause reads as follows:
... we agree that any action, taken by you or by any correspondent of
yours under or in connection with the credit or the relative drafts, docu-
ments, or property, if taken in good faith, shall be binding on us and
shall not put you or your correspondent under any resulting liability to us;
and we make like agreement as to any inaction or omission, unless in
breach of good faith. 6
By virtue of this clause, in a close case, the bank in determining what
is a "clean" bill of lading would seem to enjoy an area of discretion.
;5 In the normal case, the bank requires in the letter of credit the same documents that
are specified in the contract of procuration. FINELsTMN, LEGAL As EcmS oF Co mciALx
LETTmRs oF CREDIT 32 (1930), considers the problems arising when there is a variance
between the requirements of the letter of credit and the specifications of the contract in
the application form.
86 The form currently in use by The Hanover Bank, New York City, contains this clause.
19511
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Thus in many cases whether a bill is "clean" or "foul" will depend upon
what the bank says it is. One might argue that this seems unfair because
banks would usually favor their principal who was the customer that
brought them the business. This was not true in the Corn Exchange case
where the bank rejected its customer's view that the bill was foul and
ultimately sued him. Generally the banks engaged in this kind of business,
moreover, ate so large relative to any one customer that their reputation
among principals and beneficiaries generally is more important than
their interest in retaining a particular customer.
The Corn Exchange opinion contains a number of references that may
indicate that in that case the particular contract in the application for
a letter of credit contained an exculpatory clause similar to that quoted
above. Even if it does not, the opinion at least indicates that, as a
matter of law, the court would vest a certain amount of discretion in
the issuing bank. Thus the court states:
The integrity of foreign drafts or like bills of exchange, accompanied
by commercial bills of lading and other documents drawn against letters
of credit, should not be embarrassed or made difficult through technical or
inconsequential reasons raised against payment. 3
7
The person who must initially determine whether a reason is "tech-
nical or inconsequential" is of course the advising bank. Later in the
opinion the court explicitly states that the bank has discretion:
While, in determining strict compliance, they should not be visited with
liability for a mistake in the judgment of the officers [of the bank] hon-
estly made, they should not escape responsibility where, from an examl-
nation of the papers, it is apparent they do not conform to the letter of
credit. The bank has a discretionary power of acceptance.... 
38
The effect of the exculpatory clause quoted above as applied to the
"clean" bill of lading is merely to make explicit this "discretionary
power," and such a clause would seem almost certainly valid.
The exculpatory clauses in the principal's application for a letter of
credit dispose of the problem of a challenge by the principal to the bank's
judgment. Although the precise legal position that the beneficiary occu-
pies is not entirely clear, most authorities do not regard him as a third
party beneficiary to the contract of application for a letter of credit39 so
37 Camp v. Corn Exchange Nat. Bank, 285 Pa. 337, 343, 132 Ati. 189, 191 (1926).
38 Ibid.
39 Bril v. Suomen Pankki Finlands Bank, 97 N.Y.S. 2d, 22 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1950),
held that a beneficiary that was not notified of the opening of the credit acquired no rights
against a bank that had opened an irrevocable credit in his name. If the court had adopted
the third party beneficiary theory, the beneficiary would have acquired rights as soon as
the contract of procuration was signed. Authorities have adopted a number of conflicting
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that the terms of the principal's contract including the exculpatory clause
would not apply to limit the beneficiary's rights. His rights thus arise
solely under the letter of credit which is not merely a separate instrument
but a separate obligation, and the usual form of letters of credit contains
no exculpatory clause. The forms of export letters of credit in use by
most New York banks, however, regularly include a provision incorporat-
ing the terms of the Uniform Customs4 In the usual case where the
Uniform Customs govern, its terms limit the rights of the beneficiary.
Thus Article 18 states:
Shipping documents bearing reservations as to the apparent good order
and conditions of the goods may be refused.
Reports of the International Chamber of Commerce have made it clear
that the clause was intended to refer to the bank's relations with the
beneficiary. One such publication contains the following:
Article 18 of the Uniform Customs and Practice lays down that the
banks may refuse any shipping documents bearing reservations as to the
apparent good order and conditions of the goods. This implies that the
transport documents should be free of all reservations in respect of the
conditions of the goods, the term "goods" covering both packing and
contents.
41
The significant feature about Article 18 is that it looks to the rights
of the beneficiary and is phrased in terms that the banks "may' refuse
unless the transport documents are "free of all reservations in respect
of the conditions of the goods." The Article does not state, however,
that the bank owes a duty to its principal to refuse bills bearing any
theories as to the legal category in which a letter of credit fits. Trimble, The Law Merchant
and the Letter of Credit, 61 HARv. L. REv. 981, 997, 1002 (1948), summarizes the conflicting
views and concludes that a letter of credit can best be considered as a "mercantile specialty."
See also McCurdy, Commercial Letters of Credit, 35 HARV. L. REv. 539 (1922); GUTTER-
moG, THE LAw Or BAN ERS Coin amLx CREDITS 16-19 (1932); Thayer, Irrevocable
Credits in International Commerce, 36 COL. L. Rav. 1031 (1936) ; and Mead, Documentary
Letters of Credit, 22 COL. L. Rav. 297 (1922).
40 On July 7, 1938, the Committee on Foreign Banking of the International Chamber
of Commerce recommended to its membership that after October 1, 1938, their export
letters of credit should include a provision incorporating the Uniform Customs except where
otherwise expressly stated. See WARD AND HARFIRLD, BANK CREDITS AND ACCEPTANCES 196
(1948). Ward and Harfield further point out (at pp. 198-99) that the International
Chamber of Commerce made no recommendation "with respect to the incorporation of
reference to the Uniform Customs in letters of credit issued by our banking institutions."
This was because the Committee on Foreign Banking feared that it would impair the nego-
tiability of the instrument until the Uniform Customs became better known. Although it
was intended that the Uniform Customs govern all commercial credits issued by the member-
ship, Great Britain, a large commercial country, has not adhered to the Uniform Customs.
Most other trading countries have done so.
41 INTERNATIONAL CRAMBER OF COMMERCE, BROcmURE No. 82, EXPLANATORY NOTE (1933).
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reservation regarding the condition of the goods. In effect, this Article
therefore, confers upon the bank as against the beneficiary the same type
of discretion that the exculpatory clause in the application form confers
it vis a vis the principal.
In conclusion the prevalent legal saw that "any notation with reference
to the condition of the merchandise or its container" renders a bill "foul"
enjoys a rather limited application. It is probably not the law and cer-
tainly not the practice in regard to certain disclaimers that carriers
customarily stamp on bills. On principle, the maxim would not seem to
apply where what was stamped on the bill was essentially a repetition
of its text. Some notations, such as "discolored" scrap iron, show no
damage and thus do not qualify the statement that the goods are in
"apparent good order." Other notations, such as "fragile containers,"
that show a possibility of damage present a more difficult problem.
Unless the implication is a strong one, the notation should affirmatively
show some damage to the goods or their containers. Otherwise the effect
on market value would seem doubtful and the notation fits within Willis-
ton's suggested de minimis rule.
In the usual application form for a letter of credit, the exculpatory
clauses, together with the provisions of the Uniform Customs that the
letter incorporates, confer upon the issuing bank a limited area of dis-
cretion to determine what is a "clean" bill. Since banks in this business
generally are large relative to any one customer, they are likely to regard
their reputation among principals and beneficiaries generally as more
important than their interest in any one transaction. They would thus
appear well suited to the role of commercial arbiter within the limited
but frequently recurring area where the precise application of the rules
governing "clean" bills of lading is doubtful.
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